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Stubbs: Pleading
PLEADING
THoMAS M. STUBBS*

Conclusions
Pattersonv. Capital Health & Life Ins. Co. 1 involved the familiar
problem of whether or not the use of such terms as "willfully, wantonly and fraudulently," without alleging any facts from which
pleader drew such conclusions, were sufficient to support a claim for
punitive damages against defendant whose conduct in cancelling
the policy in question was described only by use of such adverbs. The
court logically held that no cause of action was stated for punitive
damages and, further, that proper procedure for raising such ques2
tion was that followed below, viz. motion to strike.
Conclusions, Sham
Meek8

involved an action for damages growing out of
Scott v.
an automobile collision. Defendant pleaded both general denial and
contributory negligence, and filed a counterclaim for personal injuries and property damage as well. Complainant moved to strike
counterclaim as sham because defendant had executed in writing a
full release of such claims, which recited: "The payment of such
suni -is
not an admission of liability." On hearing motion to
strike, the procedure followed in proof of sham was that recently
approved in Town of Bennettsville v. Bledsoe,4 as well as the applicable section of the Code,5 viz. by affidavit of complainant's witness
to which was attached defendant's release. Despite this and the
fact that defendant offered no evidence to controvert the release,
the trial court refused to strike the counterclaim. On appeal, this
ruling was reversed upon the ground that "where the showing in
support of the motion to strike is susceptible of no reasonable inference other than that the pleading under attack is in fact sham, the
motion to strike should be granted."
Damurrer- Declaratory Judgment
Dantzler v. Callison6 involved the propriety of sustaining of demurrer for no cause of action by trial court in an action wherein
*Associate Professor of Law. University of South Carolina.

1. 228 S.C. 297, 89 S.E. 2d 723 (1955).
2. CODE oF LAWs oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-606.
3. 228 S.C. 29, 88 S.E. 2d 768 (1955).
4. 226 S.C. 214, 84 S.E. 2d 554 (1954).
5. CODE. ov LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-654.
6. 227 S.C. 317,88 S.E. 2d 64 (1955).
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complainant sought a declaratory judgment under applicable provisions of the Code. 7 Upon appeal the order below was reversed
for the reason that the complaint stated a "justiciable controversy", as
found by the reviewing court. As to the facts, complainants, who were
neuropathic licensed physicians, sought a declaratory judgment, construing and interpreting statutes applicable to them in respect of
prescribing certain medicines, and as to which defendant, the Attorney General of South Carolina, had, by opinion, denied them the
right. The reviewing court, in reversing the court below, reasoned
that, in passing upon such demurrer, the court is not concerned with
whether complainant is right in the controversy, but only whether
he is entitled to a declaration of his rights. In this decision the
court followed its recent decision in Foster v. Foster,8 which, in
turn, followed the view of the Oregon Supreme Court in Cabell v.
City of Cottage Grove,9 and other cases in accord, holding:
it is error for a trial court, upon a demurrer in a declaratory
judgment suit, to render a decree upon the merits, but rather,
if a complaint states a justiciable controversy, the demurrer
should be overruled, and, upon the filing of the answer, a decree
entered containing a declaration of rights.
Demurrer- Failure to Plead Consideration
Gainey v. Coke'r's Pedigreed Seed Co.10 involved an action by employee against employer for breach of contract, permanent in nature
or for a term of years. Defendant demurred to complaint for no
cause of action in that the only consideration alleged for said contract
was forbearance by complainant to press a claim he had against defendant under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court below
overruled the demurrer but, on appeal, this was reversed. The reviewing court reasoned that such a contract, unsupported by any
consideration other than the mutual promises of the parties, is terminable at the will of either, unless there be an independent consideration furnished. The promise of forbearance of complainant
to press claim, under applicable sections of the Code," which gave
him an exclusive remedy in the circumstances, failed to provide the
necessary independent consideration. The court reasoned further
that it is against public policy for parties to make contracts in evasion
or avoidance of such remedy.
7. CODn OF LAWS Ol SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-2001, et. seq.

8. 226 S.C. 130, 83 S.E. 2d 752 (1954).
9. 170 Ore. 256, 130 P. 2d 1013 (1942).
10. 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E. 2d 486 (1955).
11. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-121.
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This case is consonant in reasoning and result with the earlier
one of Rabon v. State Finance Corporation,'2 where the only consideration pleaded by complainant for contract, for breach of which
an action for damages was brought, was his own promise to pay
what he already owed defendant, defendant on its part agreeing to
forbear to sue. Here demurrer for no cause of action was sustained in that in law the consideration pleaded was no consideration
at all.
Joinder of Defendants
Dobson v. American Indemnity Co.13 involved the propriety of
joinder, as defendant, of insurer with common carrier as action by
third person for damages due to negligence of the latter, and of
reference in complaint to amount of insurance carried by latterhere $50,000. Such insurance, it was alleged, was on file with the
State Insurance Commission and was required of a carrier, to which,
as here, a class "E" Certificate had been issued. Insurer moved to
strike statement of amount of policy 14 as being in excess of that
required by Commission's Rules 56 and 57,15 which limited insurance requirements to $5,000 and $1,000 respectively. Motion was
granted and, on appeal, this was affirmed. An applicable section
of the Code' 6 allows joinder of principal and surety in cases generally where, as here, an indemnity bond is required by law. But another section of the Code 17 provides for liability insurance in this
precise situation "in such amount as the Commission may determine." Rules 56 and 57 of the Commission have fixed such insurance
at limits of $5,000 and $1,000-so reasoned the reviewing courtand even though the common carrier has, as here, obtained and filed
insurance coverage in excess of those requirements, it was proper
to strike reference to the amount of such policy actually filed. The
court stated cogently:
Statute and rule doubly became parts of the contract of insurance, and, in this case, effectually reduced the amount of it
for purposes of the statute, and, therefore, for purposes of this
action.
Joinder of Defendants
8
Johns v. Castles' involved the single question of whether or not
12. 203 S.C. 183, 26 S.E. 2d 501 (1943).
13. 227 S.C. 307, 87 S.E. 2d 69 (1955).
14. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-606.

15. CODE OF LAWS O SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Vol. 7, pp. 804-806.

16.

17.

CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

COD O LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

18. 229 S.C. 51, 91 S.E. 2d 721 (1956).
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the defendant in a tort action may bring in plaintiff's employer as
joint tortfeasor for purposes of counterclaim. The trial court ruled
in the affirmative and was, on appeal, sustained, upon authority of
Brown v. Quinn.19 The rationale of the decision is that respondent
(plaintiff in counterclaim) might have initially sued employer and
employee as joint tortfeasors, a right and election which is solely
his, and that he is not deprived of such right and election merely
because he asserts it by way of counterclaim, as to which he stands
as plaintiff.
Judicial Notice
Schumacher v. Chapin2" is a case in which the sole pleading question raised is whether, in a proceeding to be declared a legitimate
heir by virtue of a purported ceremonial marriage of the parents
under applicable Code section, 2 ' which was answered merely by
a general denial, the court could properly "notice" the effective date
of the applicable statute, or whether such effective date must be
specially pleaded. The court below took judicial notice of such date
and was, on appeal, affirmed. This decision is consonant with earlier
decisions in this and other jurisdictions.
The public statutes of a state are judicially noticed by the
courts of that state . . . including the date it went into effect
22
or was published.
Facts of which the court will take judicial notice need not be
alleged, and the courts will read a pleading as if it contained a
statement of such facts .. 23
Motion to Make More Definite
In Ellen v. King24 complainant sued a building contractor and
surety upon his payment and construction bond for faulty construction of a building and non-compliance with construction contract.
Such resulted in extensive damage to complainant due to flooding
of his building, requiring an extensive outlay in rectifying the faulty
construction, it was alleged. The complaint was framed in nine
paragraphs, of which paragraph five alone had seventeen sub-paragraphs. A copy of the detailed construction contract and specifications was attached to complaint as an exhibit and referred to therein.
19. 220 S.C. 426, 68 S.E. 2d 326 (1951).
20. 228 S.C. 77, 88 S.E. 2d 874 (1955).
21. CODM OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 20-6.1.

22. 23 C. J. Evidence, Sec. 1947, p. 128; State v. Sartor, 2 Strob. 60 (S.C.

1847) ; Winn v. Harby, 166 S.C. 99, 164 S.E. 434 (1931).
23. 49 C. J. Pleading, § 11, p. 36; Uxbridge v. Poppenheim, 135 S.C. 26, 133

S.E. 461 (1926).
24. 227 S.C. 481, 88 S.E. 2d 598 (1955).
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Defendant moved to make the complaint more definite and certain2 5
in twenty-eight different respects, attacking altogether the last five
paragraphs of the complaint.
The trial court granted the motion as to one objection only, and
reserved his decision as to the others until time of the trial, and
after hearing the evidence, expressly allowed defendants to renew
their motion as of that time. Upon appeal such ruling was held not
to be erroneous in that the granting, or not, of such motion is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Such ruling, it was urged,
will be upheld unless abuse of discretion be shown, especially where,
as here, appellants fail to specify "which of the many aspects of the
motion were erroneously denied, or in what respect error was committed as to any of them."
The result of this case seems entirely sound. As early as the case
of Long v. Hunter,28 it was held that such irotion should specify
in what particulars the complaint is to be amended.
New Matter
Lee v. Soutfiern Railway Co. 2 7 involved an action by landowner
for injunction and damages against a railroad company for so constructing its track as to cause overflowing of complainant's fields
and injury to his crops. Defenses were general denial and ownership of right-of-way, the latter falling short of the requirements of
a counterclaim, but constituting a plea of avoidance and of "new
matter."28 Complainant did not reply but, upon the trial, offered
evidence showing adverse possession and estoppel in order to overcome defendant's plea of right-of-way. The trial court rejected
such evidence and, upon appeal, the Supreme Court held this to
have been reversible error under the applicable Code section.29 Although neither cited nor discussed, the language of another section
of the Code" ° seems peculiarly applicable:
But the allegation of new matter in the answer not relating to
a counterclaim.., is to be deemed controverted by the adverse
party as upon a direct denial or avoidance, as the case may require.
Since, under the above facts, defendant's plea of "New Matter" was
"deemed controverted", complainant's evidence, in support of such
contention, was erroneously excluded.
25. CODE OF LAWS O SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-606.
26. 48 S.C. 179,26 S.E. 228 (1897).

27. 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E. 2d 431 (1955).
28. CODE op LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-661.
29. CODn OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-661.
30. COD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-608.
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